Corporate Bonus and Pension Plans: A Legitimate Business Purpose Test by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1964
Corporate Bonus and Pension Plans: A Legitimate
Business Purpose Test
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Corporate Bonus and Pension Plans: A Legitimate Business Purpose Test" (1964). Minnesota Law
Review. 2805.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2805
Corporate Bonus and Pension Plans:
A "Legitimate Business Purpose" Test
In determining the validity of corporate bonus and pen-
sion plans, American courts have generally imposed a
contract-type consideration requirement, which voids
bonuses and pensions based solely on past services. In
contrast, English courts have merely looked to see if the
compensation agreement benefits the corporation. The
author of this Note suggests that application of a "legiti-
mate business purpose" test, patterned after the English
test, would give corporations valuable flexibility in the
formulation of their compensation plans. He concludes
that although the result will differ in but few cases, such
an approach will allow courts to direct their attention
exclusively to the crucial issue - whether the transac-
tion is intended to benefit the corporation.
The -law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but
there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the
benefit of the company.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Payment of bonuses and pensions to corporate employees is
under most circumstances an unquestioned practice. When such
payments are not supported by legally adequate consideration,
however, they have been held to constitute "gifts" of corporate
assets, which are prohibited under corporation law to protect the
interest of minority shareholders and creditors Past services to
the corporation are generally considered to be inadequate con-
sideration to support compensation by the corporation,4 so that
payments made on that basis can be recovered by the corpora-
tion or, if not, the directors can be held liable.5 Courts, sympa-
thetic to the corporate practice, have frequently sought to avoid
this result by finding collateral, and often remote, consideration.0
1. Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883).
2. See 1 WASHGTON & ROTHSCnMn, COMENSATNG THE CORPORATE
ExscuurvE 52 (3d ed. 1962); Cohen, Corporate Bonuses and Stockholders'
Rights, 14 TEEN. L. lRv. 87 (1936).
3. See 6A FLEIem , CycLoPIA r CORPORATIONS § 2939 n.12 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1950).
4. See 1 WILLSToN, CozrRACTs § 130B (3d ed. 1957).
5. See 5 FLrrcmm, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2143 n.20.
6. See cases cited notes 10-15 infra.
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The problem of justifying corporate distributions basically
arises where a corporation, without any prior obligation, pays a
bonus to an active employee or a bonus or pension to a retiring
employee or to the family of a deceased employee. Notwithstand-
ing that the directors might have intended in good faith to further
the best interests of the corporation and that the expenditure
constituted an ordinary and necessary business expense for tax
purposes, it has been held that a payment based only on past
services is ultra vires for lack of adequate consideration.7 This
result can seriously impede corporate efforts to maintain good
employee relations, procure new employees, and retain key exec-
utives. The question ultimately facing the courts is whether, in
light of the corporate policies underlying the practice of payment
of bonuses and pensions, traditional contract-type consideration
ought to be required. The purpose of this Note is to show that
the consideration requirement invoked by American courts as a
test of the validity of corporate compensation arrangements is
unsatisfactory; that a "legitimate business purpose" test similar
to that utilized by English courts can better serve the interests
of the corporation without detriment to the interests of minority
shareholders and creditors.
II. TWO TESTS: CONSIDERATION V. LEGITIMATE
BUSINESS PURPOSE
A. TiE AIVmicAN RULE - A SEARCH FOR CONSIDERATION
Compensation agreements based on past services are generally
held to be ultra vires in this country because corporate directors,
as trustees of corporate assets, are empowered to expend assets
only in discharge of valid and enforceable corporate obligations."
Recognizing that unrealistic results can follow from strict appli-
cation of such a rule, courts have been willing to sustain compen-
sation plans supported by theoretical rather than actual con-
sideration.
Some American courts, in searching for consideration to sup-
port corporate bonuses, have implied an agreement between the
corporation and the employee for the payment of extra compen-
sation. One such implied agreement is based on past practices
of a corporation in granting extra compensation in prosperous
7. Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952);
see text accompanying notes 51-57 infra.
8. Cf. Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscription, 12
ConN. L.Q. 467 (1927).
9. See National Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. 335, 337 (8t-h
Cir. 1899).
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years.' ° That reasoning, however, would not sustain an identical
plan adopted for the first time by a competing company because
of a lack of "past practices" upon which to base consideration.
Yet, substantially different consequences should not follow from
distinctions based on fiction. Similarly, courts have sustained
bonuses paid for "unusual" services, "above and beyond" one's
ordinary duties, on the theory of an implied promise by the em-
ployer to pay for extra services. l But factually, "ordinary" duties
are difficult to delineate in determining whether "extra" or "un-
usual" services have been performed; furthermore, the ordinary
employment contract often contemplates that occasional extra-
ordinary services are to be performed as a term of employment.
Another source of consideration to support bonuses has been
found in the legal detriment incurred by an employee in refrain-
ing from the exercise of his ever-present right to terminate his
employment.' 2 In the absence of clear proof of arm's length bar-
gaining, however, such a basis for finding consideration must fail,
since that "detriment" is theoretically incurred in every bonus
transaction but is a substantial factor in few. A similar legal detri-
ment, sufficient to support the payment of a bonus, could be found
where an employee foregoes his demand for a higher salary in
reliance on the payment of a bonus if the excellence of his serv-
ices or the company's prosperity justifies an increase. Although
the sound business purpose of minimizing fixed salary expense
might justify corporate reliance on this form of consideration, an
actual bonus agreement executed in the first instance would seem
to be a more logical way of maximizing the corporation's benefit
from such an incentive plan; the absence of strong supporting
evidence should render that type of "agreement" vulnerable to
attack.
The search for consideration has also taken place in the con-
text of payments made upon the decease or retirement of em-
ployees. One American court has found the existence of support-
ing consideration on a third-party beneficiary theory in the benefit
10. See, e.g., Church v. Har it, s5 Fid 499 (6th Cir. 1929); Neff v. Gas
& Eke. Shop, 23-2 Ky. 66, 22 S.W.2d 2 65 (1929); W'ieburgh v. Seeman Bros,
21 N.Y.Sad 180 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
11. See, e.g., Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52, 58-59 (5th
Cir. 1947); Vaught v. Charleston Natl Bank, 62 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1933); cf.
Church v. 1arnit, 35 F.ad 499 (6th Cir. 1929) (quantum meruit); 1 WmasToN,
CoNTRmcTs § 36 (Sd ed. 1957); 5 Coax. L.Q. 450 (1920).
12. See, e.g., Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.YS.&d 809, 817
(Sup. Ct. 1952); Diamond v. Davis, 88 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. CL), aff'd without
opinion, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Ist Dep't 1942), affd without
opinion, 292 N.Y. 552, 54 NXE.2d 683 (1944).
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conferred to the corporation from the higher morale of its remain-
ing employees and the enhanced reputation of the corporation in
the community resulting from such bonuses or pensions.1" A diffi-
cult evidentiary problem is presented in those cases, however, as
to whether benefit from improved morale and reputation was
actually received. Payments to departed employees might be
more easily justified as a legitimate attempt to benefit the corpo-
ration in a manner similar to advertising, and the courts then
would not be burdened with evaluation of the actual results.
Bonus and pension agreements have also been sustained in cases
where the retiring recipient reputedly promised to render counsel
when requested or promised to refrain from competing with the
corporation.14 Since such "contracts" are technically valid if the
promisor remains "available" to advise or could in fact compete, 1
the door is opened to payments, unjustifiable as pensions, under
the guise of consultant or noncompetition contracts. In order to
avoid this abuse, possible under the usual contract approach, the
courts should apply an objective test to such transactions, sus-
taining only those where it appears that it is the good faith intent
of the directors that the corporation shall benefit.
Although bonuses and pensions, ostensibly paid for past serv-
ices, in many instances can be justified according to contract
principles, such a common business practice should not be de-
pendent on the finding of certain facts which are often collateral
to the main business considerations motivating the bonus. The
main business purposes for payment of bonuses to active em-
ployees would seem to be to create an incentive for the employees
to raise their productivity and to maintain as low a fixed salary
13. Acker v. MacDonald, Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., N.Y., April 26, 1940. (Not
reported.)
The payment of retirement allowances measured by past services to
those employees at or above retirement age or 'too near retirement age
to -achieve an adequate allowance otherwise, is not an additional pay-
ment for services, previously rendered, or a gratuity, but is a justified
expenditure from the point of view of the corporation in that it removes
super-annuated employees, reduces payroll, improves the morale and
efficiency of the younger employees remaining in the employ, attracts
better employees, and benefits the relations between the corporation
and the public.
14. See, e.g., Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir.
1916); Preis v. Eversharp, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Good v.
Modem Globe, Inc., 346 Mich. 602, 78 N.W.2d 199 (1956); Rosen v. Guaran-
teed Sanitation, Inc., 32 Iisc. 2d 698, 225 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1961). But see Beers
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 Hun 75, 20 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1892).
15. See Good v. Modem Globe, Inc., 346 Mich. 602, 611, 78 N.W.2d 199,
204 (1956).
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commitment as possible in order to ease the burden in unprofit-
able years. Similarly, payments on the decease or retirement of
employees not only improve the morale and incentive of remain-
ing employees to stay with the corporation but also give the
corporation a good "public image." Since stockholders have pre-
sumptively approved of the business acumen of corporate direc-
tors, 6 courts are not justified in impeding the good faith efforts
of directors in furthering legitimate corporate interests through
reasonable "gratuitous" compensation arrangements. On the other
hand, whatever standard is used in testing corporate bonuses and
pensions, it is the stockholder's interest that is of prime concern.'r
16. Presumably, if stockholders did not approve of their directors' judg-
ment, hey would not ,have purchased stock in that particular corporation, or
would sell that stock which they hold.
17. Coim aare BERTE, THE 2OTa CENTURY CArrALisT REVOLUTION 164-88
(1954) and Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Truttee?, 45 HAnv. L.
REV. 1145 (1932), with Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trztcs: A
Note, 45 1hAnv. L. Xxv. 1365 1932). In 1932 Professor Dodd took the position
that corporate managers are trustees for the joint benefit of shareholders, em-
ployees, consumers and the general public. Professor Berle immediately rejected
that position, asserting that
you can not abandon emphasis on "the view that business corporations
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders" until
such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforce-
able scheme of responsibilities to someone else .... Either you have
asystem based on individual ownership of property or you do not ....
Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed under the
corporate form ... is simply handed over, weakly, to the present
administrators with a -pious wish that something nice will come out of
it all.
Berle, smpra at 1367-68.
It is interesting to note that 22 years later Professor Berle altered his posi-
tion 180 degrees, stating that Professor Dodd took the better view in their
earlier controversy. BEu , op. cit. supra at 169.
In envisioning the fiduciary duty owed to society by corporate manage-
ment, it appears that perhaps Professors Dodd and Berle differ from the
traditional view in form only. For example, in determining whether giant cor-
porations ihould assure the availability of a first-rate college education or
should avoid.turning a thriving city into a ghost-town because of greater profit-
making opportunities elsewhere, the society beneficiary and the stockholder-
beneficiary viewpoints would likely coincide. One would call it a duty to
society and the other, in its enlightened self-interest, would realize its long
range personnel needs equired the availability of good colleges and that the
importance of its public image prohibited creating a ghost-town. Professor
Berle probably best sums up his and Professor Dodd's position - "we are
nibbling at the edges of a vast, dangerous, and fascinating piece of thinking."
BEnLE, op. cit. supra at 174; cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 MIch. 459, 170
N.W. 668 (1919) (the court disapproved of Mr. Ford's altruistic inclinations
and compelled the declaration of dividends).
1964]
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Therefore, when retroactive bonuses appear to be a management
attempt to "share the profits" at the operational level, stockhold-
ers have good cause to object.
B. Tmr ENGLISH RULE - A LooK AT BENEFIT
The English courts rejected the consideration approach to
corporate bonus agreements.' In determining whether corporate
directors had the power to grant compensation for past services,
the English courts merely inquired whether the transaction was
intended to benefit the company. 9 Ultimately a three-part stand-
ard was established: Gratuitous company payments had to be
(1) reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's
business; (2) bona fide; and (3) made for the benefit and to pro-
mote the prosperity of the company 0
By freeing itself from the tenets of contract law, the English
judiciary has been able to maintain remarkable flexibility in pass-
ifig on gratuitous distributions of company assets. In an early
case, Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co.,2 a grant of £100,000 by a
chemical manufacturing company to universities or other scien-
tific institutions in the United Kingdom was held to be intra vires
when the benefit to the corporation from establishing "a reservoir
of trained experts" from which the company would be able to
18. See Cyclists' Touring Club v. Hopkinson, [1910] 1 Ch. 179 (1909);
Henderson v. Bank of Australasia, 40 Ch. D. 170 (1888); Hutton v. West Cork
Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654 (1883); 76 SOL. J. 505 (1932). The bonus in Hutton was
held to 'be invalid on the ground that it was paid incidentally to the "winding
up" of the company and not for the purpose of carrying on the railway
business.
19. Good faith on the part of directors without intent to benefit the com-
pany was deemed to .be insufficient justification for past service compensation.
One court envisioned "a lunatic conducting the affairs of the company, and
paying away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bona fide yet
perfectly irrational." Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 28 Ch. D. 654, 671 (1883).
20. In re Lee, Behrens & Co., [1982] 2 Clh. 46, 51 (1931). In Lee an annuity
was voted to the widow of the deceased managing director. When the com-
pany went into liquidation the court refused the widow's claim since no evi-
dence was introduced of the 'board's intent to 'benefit the company by pay-
ment of the annuity. The court did admit, however, that a company generally
does have the power to provide for the welfare of former employees. The fact
that this case arose out of a liquidation proceeding rather -than from the ob-
jection of a shareholder of a going concern may have affected the result.
21. [1921] 1 Ch. 359, 367 (1920). In answer to the objecting shareholder's
argument that much of the 'benefit from the grant would inure to competing
companies, the court made the assumption that (the directors will consider that
and other factors in determining whether such application of funds is to the
company's advantage. (There was no hint in this case that the company was
not financially sound.)
select men was found to be not too remote. The Evans case could
be interpreted as the beginning of a "benefit to society" test; but
the recent decision in Parke v. The Daily News 2 ended any such
notion. Parke involved the sale of two large newspapers for about
L2,000,000 with a resulting loss of employment to many. The sell-
ing company distributed certain amounts to its former employees
as it was obligated to do under the employment contract; in addi-
tion, it authorized distribution of £1,125,000 to the affected em-
ployees as compensation for loss of pension rights representing
one week's pay for each year of service. An objecting shareholder
sought to enjoin this gratuitous payment on the ground that it
was ultra vires. The court determined that the directors did not
intend primarily to benefit the company by authorization of the
severance pay; notwithstanding that the director's motives were
'laudable" and "enlightened from the point of view of industrial
relations," the payments were held ultra vires since the director's
main purpose was to benefit the former employeesP
Reduced to the narrowest possible view, Parke holds that pay-
ment of one week's wages to a discharged employee is ultra vires
even where there are no competing creditors. Viewed more
broadly, it reaffirms the proposition that a company must be run
for the benefit of the shareholders. Although reasonable severance
pay ordinarily provides a benefit to the shareholders through bet-
ter industrial relations, such a payment is not beneficial when it
requires distribution of an amount out of proportion to the pos-
sible advantages to be derived. There may be some question of
whether the proper result was reached in Parke,2 4 but the court's
approach did deal directly with the crucial factor. The fact that
the proposed compensation was for past services and was not
supported by consideration was deemed, as it should have been,
irrelevant. 5 The approach of the English courts has had no ap-
peal, however, in most American jurisdictions.
I. "LEGITIMITE BUSINESS PURPOSE" AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TIRE CONSIDERATIONREQUIREMENT
Adoption of a "legitimate business purpose" test, patterned on
the English cases, would settle much of the uncertainty that has
22. [1962] 2 Al ER. 929 (Oh.), 1962 C(ii. LJ. 141, 25 MODEmx L. REv.
715 (1962).
23. [1962] 2 All ER. at 948.
24. The company contended that severance pay was required to avoid
incurring the hostility of trade unions and therefore was in the best interest of
the company. Id. at 947; see 25 MoDERx L. Rrv. 715, 715-16 (1962).
25. [1962] 2 All E/. at 947.
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been created by the diverse treatment afforded past service com-
pensation arrangements by American courts. The unpredictability
of the result in most cases has not been nearly as great as the un-
predictability of the approach taken by the court. "The "legiti-
mate business purpose" test, if substituted for the consideration
requirement, would change the result in few cases but it would
permit courts to deal directly with the crucial issue -whether
the transaction in question is intended to benefit the corporation
- thereby giving greater assurance that a desirable result will be
reached by applying a single standard.
A. BONUSES TO ACTIVE EMPLOYEES
The application of the legitimate business purpose test to rep-
resentative American cases clearly illustrates its efficacy in focus-
ing on what must be the underlying rationale for the court's result.
In Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp.,." an objecting shareholder
contended that payment of a $51,000 bonus in addition to a
$175,000 salary to the president of Republic was ultra vires. The
court, after finding that the president's salary was "fixed" in
accordance with an applicable statute 7 by a director's resolution
providing for $175,000 "plus any additional amount, if any, as
the board of directors may determine prior to Dec. 31, 1940, '' 5
determined that the consideration requirement was satisfied by
an implied promise to pay additional compensation in good
years?' The court obviously felt constrained to reach this result
because of evidence that the president had earned $359,000 in
his last year with his previous employer. An opposite result in
Holmes would have been an unjustifiable judicial interference
with a legitimate business transaction. It was clearly in the share-
holders' interest for the company not to "fix" the president's
salary at the much higher level that would have been required
had the bonus system failed, 0 for under the bonus plan, the
26. 84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E.2d 508 (1948), reversing 69 N.E.2d 396
(Ohio C.P. 1946), 95 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1947).
27. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:3-1 (1939). Every corporation shall have power to:
e. Appoint such officers and agents as the business of the corporation
may require, and fix their compensation.
28. 84 Ohio App. at 450, 84 N.E.2d at 512. The board's resolution could
in no way be construed to be an offer for a unilateral contract, since the
promise of additional compensation was patently illusory.
29. Church v. Harnit, 85 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929), which involved similar
facts, provided adequate authority for upholding the bonus in Holmes once
the existence of an implied contract had -been established.
30. See McGuire, Chiu & Elbing, Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52
A-mn. EcoN. REv. 753 (1962). This Article suggests that a greater correlation
president received additional compensation only when justified
by earnings generated by his management of the company. The
bonus in Holmes, or any bonus paid in good faith, with a long-run
intent to benefit the corporation, is not the proper subject of
judicial review. That is not to say, however, that courts should
not stand ready to intervene where gratuitous distributions do
not appear to have a legitimate business purpose. In evaluating
directors' intent, an objective test should be applied which meas-
ures the circumstances surrounding any distribution in question
against the standards and requirements of that industry.
Stock options were granted in Frankel v. Donovan.3 by a cor-
poration as additional compensation to provide an incentive for
key executives and retain the services of executives that might
otherwise leave. Although the court took notice of the company's
salary ceiling "which was fixed at an unrealistic level by an obso-
lete federal law,'3 2 it nevertheless held that increased loyalty and
job satisfaction among employees is not adequate consideration
to support an option plan. The court found that unless provision
be made to prevent an employee from taking his options and
leaving prior to rendering the services expected in return for the
options, the stock-option plan lacked adequate consideration.a
A court applying the legitimate business purpose test would
likely have reached a contrary result on the basis that the low
ceiling imposed on salaries made a supplemental compensation
plan necessary in order to retain competent employees.
Where a corporation grants stock options to its employees
exercisable within five years whether or not the employee remains
in the employ of the granting corporation, objectively, the pri-
mary purpose of the plan does not appear to be to benefit the
corporation 4 Although the option plan might have been intended
exists between volume of sales and executive compensation than between
profits and executive compensation. The conclusion that seems to follow from
that study is that lower executive salaries supplemented by a bonus plan
based on profits would be desirable from the shareholder's viewpontL
31. 35 Del. Ch. 433, 120 A.2d 311 (New Castle 1956).
S2. Id. at 488, 120 A.2d at 314. The company was a federally subsidized
shipping line, subject to salary limitations imposed -by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936.49 Stat. 1985. The Act was repealed in 1952.
33. Provision was made for the option to terminate three months after an
employee left his employment, but apparently this was not adequate precau-
tion. Id. at 436, 120 A_2d at 313.
34. See Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E).
Pa. 1944). The corporation in Budd provided that stock options were not
exercisable after the holder's employment was discontinued "unless otherwise
specified by the Board of Directors." That plan failed because the bonus had
no relation to the services rendered since the optionees undertook no obliga-
NOTE1964]
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to reward past service, it is more likely that it was intended to
provide an incentive for employees to strive for greater corporate
profits in the future. Where an employee quits immediately after
receipt of such an option, retaining the right to exercise that op-
tion five years later, the purpose of the plan might be frustrated.
Yet the granting of options, whenever exercisable, acts to deter
an employee from quitting, since as an option holder he has an
incentive to stay with the corporation and direct his efforts toward
higher corporate profits and the enhancement of the value of his
option. Where an option is granted expressly in exchange for an
employee's promise to continue his services, obviously, a much
stronger case is presented to support the directors' legitimate
business purpose.8
Even though there is no precisely defined relationship between
a reasonable bonus for purposes of benefit to the corporation and
a reasonable bonus for purposes of an income tax business deduc-
tion, adverting to the latter standard might be helpful in resolving
the former question; however, the consideration rule would dis-
claim any relationship, while the legitimate business purpose test
might recognize one. For example, in Frj v. National Rejectors,
Inc.,"0 the executors of a deceased corporate officer's estate sought
to recover the full amount of an outstanding bonus. The Internal
Revenue Service had previously disallowed as a business deduc-
tion the difference between a bonus of 121/2 percent and 20 percent
of the profits in excess of $300,000 as excessive compensation.1
The Missouri court could well have held as a matter of law that
such a bonus was an attempt to benefit an individual employee
at the expense of the shareholders and that no intent to benefit
the corporation can be found when it is known that such pay-
ments will incur tax deficiencies.3 s The Treasury Regulations
clearly state that a bonus paid in good faith as additional com-
tion to continue their employment. However, the court narrowed the scope of
its opinion by conceding that "there can ,be no doubt that the granting of
bonuses to employees may have a legitimate and valid function in a business
... ." Id. at 129.
35. Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103, 116, (Sup. Ct.) aff'd without
opinion, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd without
opinion, 292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944).
36. 306 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1957).
37. The bonus agreement provided for modification or discontinuance of
payments in case of "unusual or extraordinary contingencies." The court held
that the assessment for tax deficiencies due to the "excessive" compensation
plan was such an "unusual or extraordinary contingency" so as to justify re-
ducing the bonus to 12/2 percent.
38. In that sense, Internal Revenue Service findings should raise a pre-
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pensation for services actually -endered is deductible if, when
added to the salary already paid, it does not exceed reasonable
compensation for the services rendered 9 This indicates that rea-
sonable bonuses based merely on past services are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses,4 and a finding of de-
ductibility might well serve as evidence of the reasonableness of
the corporate expenditure.
An early Missouri lse, Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp.,41 indi-
cates the utility of the legififnate business purpose test. The board
of directors appropriated $50,000 for the purpose of paying bo-
nuses to the employees, -the amounts of the bonuses "to be deter-
mined by the 'president in view of the services rendered by each."4-
The bonuses, ranging from $50 to $18,800, werei'paid only two
months after thie inceptioui of the plan, the latter amount being
paid-to the president himself.4 X Relying mainly on the English
"benefit? rile, the court had no difficulty upholding the legality
of the bonuses'.
An expected bonus,based upon results tends to discourage and expose
employees- who are. inclined -to be lazy, thoughtless, inefficient, and
sumption as to the validity'of bonuses, since loss of a deduction for a bonus
would seem, to be prima facie evidence that'the bonus was not beneficial to
the corporation. I.RS. findings should be given prospective effect only- bo-
nuses paid prior to notice of disallowance should be tested on the basis of the
good faith intent of the diietors to benefit the company. It is not the wisdom
of -the findings tlkht necessarily makes them important; but -the adverse effect a
disallowance has on profits available to stockholders should cause grave doubt
as to the intent of the directors to-benefit the company. In evaluating bonuses,
the Treasury Department seems most concerned with attempts to distribute
earnings to owners of businesses and attempts to purchase property through
the guise of deductible bonuses. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1);
Trea. Reg. § 1.162-7 to -9 (1963).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.1620-9(1963).
40. But cf. Treas. IReg. § 1.16,-7(b)(2) (1963).
Generally speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a
free -bargain between the employer and the individual =de before the
serve are rendered, not influenced by any consideration on the part
of the employer other -thn that of securing on fair and advantageous
terms the services of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction
even though ... it may prove to be greater than the amount which
would ordinarily be paid.
(Emphasis added.)
41. 307 Mo. 74, 269 S.W. 593 (1925).
42. Id. at 83, 269 S.W. at 594.
43. Apparently the president did a great deal of traveling and was a suc-
cessful salesman of shoes-not his primary duty as president. Net profits for
the year in question were $150,000 before payment of the bonuses. Id. at 86,
88, 269 S.W. at 594, 595.
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wasteful. Experience has demonstrated that -the payment of a bonus
. .. is advantageous to stockholders of corporations employing labor.4 4
The propriety of the result in Putnam is not relevant for present
purposes, but the approach taken by the court, standard in other
areas of business and corporate law,45 is worth noting: The court
first determined that no fraud had occurred, then that the plan
was intended to benefit the company, and last, that the court
would not substitute its judgment for that of the directors.
B. RETURMNT COMPENSAION
American courts have had a more difficult time finding the
existence of consideration for an agreement to pay a bonus or
pension when the recipient of such compensation is no longer
employed by the granting corporation. Lost, at that point, is the
argument that payment of the bonus will provide to the employee
"an incentive to retain his services, sharpen his interest, intensify
his zeal, spur him on to more ardent effort in the interest and for
the benefit of the company, and to enable him thereby to share
in the resulting success of the enterprise. ' 40 As a result, corpora-
tions have resorted to the "noncompetition" contract, an agreement
by the retired employee not to compete with the granting corpo-
ration, in order to meet the consideration requirement.47 The
problem of finding consideration for pension contracts, however,
has diminished in recent years with the advent of formal pension
plans.48
In Fogelson v. American Woolen Co.,49 a corporation proposed
to pay $4,000,000 into a pension trust fund, computing the pen-
44. Id. at 91, 269 S.W. at 596.
45. Absent fraud, courts generally will not review the expediency of con-
tracts or other business transactions authorized -by the directors. See BALLAN-
TI E, CORPORATIONS § 63a (Rev. ed. 1946).
46. Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103, 113 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without
opinion, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd without
opinion, 292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E.2d 683 ,(1944).
47. See cases cited note 14 supra and accompanying text.
48. See O'Neal, Stockholder Attacks on Corporate Pension Systems, 2
VAND. L. REv. 351 (1949). The consideration problem still exists in formal
pension plans where the pension agreement is entered with an employee sub-
stantially after the inception of his employment. Since retirement income is
usually -based on years of service, where an old employee contracts for a
pension based on his total term of employment, those pension rights which
vest in him immediitely are -based on past services rendered. Such a retirement
plan was upheld in Meyers v. Cowdin, 47 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
af'd without opinion, 270 App. Div. 827, 60 N.Y.S.2d 129 (2d Dep't 1946),
aJJ'd without opinion, 296 N.Y. 755, 70 N.E.9dd 555 (1946).
49. 170 F.2d 660 (.d Cir. 1948).
sions on a percentage formula according to the employee's salary
and length of service; on the basis of the plan the president of
the corporation was eligible for a $54,000 annual pension begin-
ning the following year, and the next highest pension was to be
only $7,285. Because there was no evidence establishing that the
large pension was necessary to retain the president's services, the
Second Circuit concluded that the $54,000 pension might have
been intended primarily to benefit him personally. The court re-
versed the summary judgment entered below against the object-
ing shareholders and held that a triable issue of fact existed on
whether the president's pension would amount to an illegal gift.
Fogelson seemed to turn on the reasonableness"0 of the amount
payable to the president in relation to the possible benefit to be
derived by the corporation rather than on the failure of the plan
to meet the consideration requirement, for the validity of the
remainder of the pension plan was implicitly upheld by the court
despite its past-service benefits. Although the court may have
been applying the English "benefit" rule, the unnecessarily broad
language employed severely limits the value of the decision as
authority for any rule.
Probably the greatest obstacle to pension payments based on
past services is the decision of the Pennsylvania court in Moore
v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Jo. 1 Upon the death of the president-
founder, the corporation voted to pay $2,083 per month to his
widow "in recognition of . . . valued services rendered . . . by
her deceased husband."52 In an action contesting the plan brought
by a minority shareholder, the court went so far as to assume
that the payments to the widow were intended by the directors
50. Of. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.Rd
581 (Sip. Ct. 1948), 25 IND. LJ. 212 (1950). A past-service bonus was upheld
by the court on the apparent "theory" that because the amount was reason-
able, the consideration requirement was satisfied. Blish seems to represent
merely a liberal application of an old rule rather than any type of new
approach.
51. 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952), 101 U. PA. L. Plv. 153 (1952).
52. 370 Pa. at 175, 87 A2d at 297. A Pennsylvania statute allowed pensions
to retired employees, but the court, in not mentioning the statute, must have
concluded that it didn't apply to widows of employees. Pa. Laws 1933, act
364, art. fIM, § 316. In 1957, act 711, § 1 was enacted which directly overruled
Moore. PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2852-316 (1958). It specifically provided for, inter
alia, pensions to widows of employees. In Osborne v. United Gas Improvement
Co., 354 Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1946) the Pennsylvania court upheld a pension
plan -based, in part, on past services. The only legally significant distinction
between Osborne and Moore is the fact that Moorc involved a pension to the
widow of a deceased employee; whereas, in Osborne the pension was payable
to retired employees only, thereby falling precisely within the 1933 statute
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to be for the best interests of the corporation," and the court also
took judicial notice of the Treasury Regulation which specifically
allowed deduction as an ordinary and necessary expense that
amount of a deceased officer's salary which is paid to his widow.4
Nevertheless, since the corporation was not legally obligated to
make such payments, the court held that the corporate action
amounted to an illegal "giving away" of corporate assets and
ordered the widow to repay the $24,000 she had already received
and held the directors accountable for any balance left unpaid
by the widow.
On the facts as assumed by the court in Moore, an untenable
result was reached. The case should have been remanded for trial
of the question of whether or not the directors' action was in-
tended in good faith to benefit the corporation" and whether the
amount of the pension was reasonable under the circumstances.
By basing its decision solely on lack of consideration, the court
reached an unsound result. On the basis of the Moore decision, a
$50 per week pension to the widow of a deceased worker is ultra
vires, even though the corporation may suffer damage to employee
morale and to its reputation in the community by not paying the
pension. 6 "Good will"57 represents a substantial portion of the
value of a going concern, and corporate directors should be given
as much freedom as possible in their efforts to protect that asset.
The fiduciary capacity in which directors hold corporate assets
cited above. From the standpoint of the public policy considerations which
must have motivated the enactment of the 1933 statute, the distinction be-
tween allowing pensions to retired employees and allowing pensions to the
families of deceased employees is tenuous.
53. 370 Pa. at 176, 87 A.2d at 297.
54. Id. at 178, 87 A.2d at 298. The regulation in point was Treas. Reg.
111, § 2923(a)-9 (1943). The court found it to 'be irrelevant that the pay-
ments in question were deductible for federal tax purposes. 370 Pa. at 178, 87
A.2d at 298.
55. Cf. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581
(1958), 22 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 710 (1954); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah 2d 101, 829 P.2d 398 (1958), 6 UTAH L. Ray. 270 (1959); Evans v.
Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359 (1920). These cases involve charitable
gifts not expressly authorized by statute. A -broad range of discretion was al-
lowed by each court for the directors to determine whether the gifts in question
were in the best interest of the corporation.
56. Cf. STRONG, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IlN OPERATION 1-11 (1951).
57. "Good will" has been defined as "the fixed and favorable consideration
of customers arising from an established and well-conducted business." Colton
v. Duvall, 254 Mich. 346, 849, 237 N.W. 48, 49 (1931). "The good will of a
business is property which the law protects and for injuries to it damages may
be recovered." Sessinghaus Milling Co. v. Hanebrink, 247 Mo. 212, 222, 152
S.W. 354, 357 (1912).
NOTE
imposes a negative duty on them to refrain from wasting corpo-
rate assets. An affirmative duty, however, is also imposed, requir-
ing fiduciaries to conserve and enhance the value of the assets
they hold. The line where "good will" protection ends and "giving
away" of assets begins lies somewhere in the broad area of past-
service compensation. When the existence of this division is rec-
ognized by American courts, the location of the line will follow
on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
"Legitimate business purpose" as a substitute for considera-
tion in testing the validity of corporate compensation agreements
is not a concept which will necessarily make the court's task
easier. The evidentiary problems in establishing the absence of
fraud, determining a standard of "reasonableness," and analyzing
the objective intent of directors will raise difficulties. By using
a business oriented approach in resolving what is necessarily a
business problem, however, courts will not lose sight of their real
purpose- that of protecting shareholders and creditors from
abuses of discretion by corporate directors. Application of tradi-
tional contract law doctrine in this area requires excessive for-
mality and imposes an undue burden on the imagination of cor-
porate attorneys by requiring them to invent "benefits conferred"
or "detriments incurred" by employees in order to establish the
existence of consideration. Corporate compensation should be gov-
erned by a body of law that can, independently, grow and change
with business needs.
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